Coxey as a young man, ca. Following of the failure of these two companies, a panic erupted on the stock market. Hundreds of businesses had overextended themselves, borrowing money to expand their operations. When the financial crisis struck, banks and other investment firms began calling in loans, causing hundreds of business bankruptcies across the United States.
Cambridge University Press, The concern follows naturally from his fundamental Banking Panics of the Great Depression and so it is not surprising that he compares banking upheavals between the two periods.
But more on this later. First, let us tour the book, and a fascinating tour it is. Wicker seeks to do three things. Secondly, there nonetheless are gaps, and these Wicker seeks to fill by going beyond Sprague in garnering evidence on the number of bank failures and the location of runs on banks, particularly outside New York.
Lastly, he concentrates on the NYCH and its vacillating and finally inept role. Another is his attempt to detect whether the financial panics had any real effects.
The suspensions are by type of bank and whether in New York City or in the Interior. Included in the category of banks are private banks, which really are brokerage houses parading under the name bank. The principal assets in which they deal are speculative securities, but their liabilities are called deposits.
With apologies to Gertrude Stein, it is not true that a bank is a bank is a bank. Not surprisingly, failures of these private banks dominate the suspension data.
One of the most important findings is that the number of suspensions was quite small. The following four chapters discuss the specifics of the five banking panics, with those of and lumped together.
The reason is that in retrospect neither seems like much of a problem, much less a panic. Also, there was a suspension of cash payments.
Of further interest, and this is original, the bank suspensions were concentrated outside New York City. Further, private banks — brokerage houses in effect — accounted for almost sixty percent of the suspensions.
Unfortunately, Wicker was not able to get data on the size of the suspended deposits, much less their size relative to total deposits.
The real effects were virtually nil, as neither the Balke-Gordon nor Romer Christina, not Christine, as Wicker repeatedly mentions real GNP series reported a sizeable drop.
The real effects on the and panics were even less. That output grew was not in question for either panic. Whether its growth increased or decreased is what was in dispute.
Whether there really was a banking panic is less clear. Wicker basically concludes that there was a financial panic but not a banking one. In fact, he titles the chapter, The Incipient Banking Panics.
The origin is not in New York but in the interior. Of the suspensions, only three were in New York City. Because the troubles were far removed from New York, the money market banks, the members of the NYCH, were essentially unresponsive.
In fact, the NYCH is virtually absent from the chapter. Of the banking panic narratives, the one in this chapter is by far the most detailed and fascinating. Here there are tales of ethnic community banks and runs.
There also is specific attention to the particulars in several cities, among which are Kansas City, Louisville, and Portland, Oregon.
Sprague recognized that the panic was in the interior, but was unable to get satisfactory data. Wicker fills this lacuna. The real GNP data upon which Wicker relies exclusively argue against a depression in that year.
During the depression of –96, most European countries experienced a drastic fall in prices. Still, many corporations were able to reduce production costs and achieve better productivity rates, and, as a result, industrial production increased by 40% in Britain and by over % in Germany. The Gilded Age Panics The two panics, or depressions, of the Gilded Age occurred in and Both of these panics were due to a major economic downfall, and they each spanned over multiple years. The Panic of Drew E. VandeCreek, Northern Illinois University The Panic of began on September 18 with the failure of the Philadelphia investment house of Jay Cooke.
This stands in contrast to the evidence in the Kuznets-Kendrick data, which Friedman and Schwartz used. They show an almost four percent annual rate of decline for Home — Essay Samples — History — Gilded Age — The Panics and Depressions of and During the Gilded Age This essay has been submitted by a student.
This is not an example of the work written by professional essay writers. The Panic of Drew E. VandeCreek, Northern Illinois University The Panic of began on September 18 with the failure of the Philadelphia investment house of Jay Cooke.
The panics in , , , , and were confined to New York and nearby cities and states. The panics in , , and spread throughout the nation. Regional panics also struck the midwestern states of Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin in ; the mid-Atlantic states of Pennsylvania and Maryland in ; and Chicago in Summary and Definition of Panic of Definition and Summary: The Panic of during the 'Gilded Age' and was a financial crisis that triggered a depression that lasted for four years leading to economic hardships, civil unrest, demonstrations and labor action such as the Pullman plombier-nemours.com crisis led to the national unemployment rate approaching 20%.
The Gilded Age Panics The two panics, or depressions, of the Gilded Age occurred in and Both of these panics were due to a major economic downfall, and they each spanned over multiple years. During the depression of –96, most European countries experienced a drastic fall in prices.
Still, many corporations were able to reduce production costs and achieve better productivity rates, and, as a result, industrial production increased by 40% in Britain and by over % in Germany.